

Reflecting on aid and development policy, David Mosse (2004) asks whether good policy is implementable

How far is this true in relation to implementing aid in post conflict situations? Use at least one empirical case study to answer the question.

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Introduction

The aid architecture in post-conflict societies is complex as the *Aid Regime* includes various multilateral and bilateral donors, humanitarian aid, and international and national non-government organisations (NGOs) (Goodhand, 2006, p. 15). The purpose of this essay is to establish the compound failures of the international institutions in regard to policy, aid, and practice in Afghanistan. In order to reflect whether good policy is implementable, I will analyse Jonathan Goodhand's case studies in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. To ascertain the Claim statement on Good Governance in Afghanistan: Will the template style of post-conflict intervention be responsive or irresponsible to the variations demanded by local circumstances? At the outset there are certain assumptions in the case studies. Both case studies rely on an actor-oriented approach and qualitative analysis; both relate to NGOs' conflict and peace-building; and both suffer from the human agency approach and mismanaged time frames. The last point is more pertinent in the case of Afghanistan (Goodhand, 2006, pp. 6-9). As set out above, the aid architecture in most post-conflict societies is complex. In order to address the issue, I analyse various case studies to compare and contrast Sri Lanka and Afghanistan, and provide a nuanced analysis complemented by description to give a unique explanation in each case only then can the failures of Afghanistan be understood in the concluding part. The similarities between the abovementioned countries are that both countries were classified as *complex political emergencies* and were linked to *globalisation* (Goodhand, 2006, p. 180). Peace in both countries was hampered by the failures of the top-down elite system explained later on.

Before analysing the empirical evidence, based on the relationship of the Non-Government Organisations (NGO) and the State. It is worth pointing out the research limitation which was too focused on *aid-centric* programmes, and that the approaches relied on fieldwork and in-depth analysis. This approach focuses on stakeholder analysis, this type of approach was perhaps used to avoid organisational risks and safety managements (Heyse, 2015, p. 19). . The evidence shows that the policies are inclined towards the use of public money for domestic corporate expansions, whereas what was required in Afghanistan was a capital investment to build services and infrastructure. Hence, development aid in Afghanistan was lopsided, because of the multitude of NGOs who distanced themselves from the state and acted as the non-state form of governance ignored the institutional elements. This type of intervention has produced a hybridisation model of a political order which was genuinely different to the norms of Afghan society as the protection was embedded in western policies where NGOs played a big role (Levine, 2014, p. 301). Although both case studies are unlike the western institutions, even peace was hybridised in Afghanistan by a number of agencies

who experimented with the village Shura, including the Norwegian Church Aid, International Red Cross and Crescent movements, UNICEF, UNDP peace initiatives, UN agencies, DFID, and World Food Programmes to mention a few (Goodhand & Sedra, 2010). It was clear that Wilsonian NGOs aligned themselves with government policies, but NGOs such as OXFAM and Red Cross were reticent to state power and kept away from government policies and pressures (Goodhand, 2006, pp. 153-154)

As far as the concept of peace-building is concerned, the UN and its partners promote civil and political rights in post-conflict societies which are based on a universal formula (Davis, 2013, p. 20). The Fragile State Index 2017 monitors fragile states and has Afghanistan on High Alert (Fund For Peace, 2017). Furthermore, the Political Instability Index shows that political unrest in most countries has increased, and out of 165 countries, Afghanistan was seventh and most vulnerable (The Economist, 2009). Davis (2013) argues that the damages caused by the Liberal Peace Theory and peace-building efforts and the altruistic motivations of the international community have come under scrutiny. Reconstruction was often seen as a window of opportunity to implement policy reform and bring in good policies in the form of *Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reconstruction (DDR)*. The long-term objectives of development policy-making in post-conflict societies itself are questionable as the Vulnerability Chart Index mentioned previously highlights policy failures. The UN Department of Peace-Making and The World Bank report of 2011 on 16 projects found that 44% would revert back to conflict after the first five years of peace (Davis, 2013, p. 23). Critics argue that politicisation of aid, globalisation of terror, and spread of religious fundamentalists require more than managerial responses in post-conflict fragile states (Bruderlein & Gassmann, 2006, p. 72). These are political issues and beyond the scope of this essay. It is easier to unravel humanitarian aid rather than military aid, which is essential in understanding why the Marshal Plan, for instance, was a failure because not only it was not supported by the local people in Afghanistan, but also there has been no post conflict peace (Castillo, 2008). The concept of peace-building raises the need to examine how the UN and its partners promote civil and political rights in post-conflict societies based on a universal formula (Davis, 2013, p. 20). Jonathan Goodhand (2006) argues that peace-building is a political task, which is associated with counter-terrorism, security in the nation state, and restructuring economies (Goodhand, 2006, p. 12). In order to reflect on the question the essay analyses, Sri Lanka, the geopolitics of Aid. The winners and losers in the context of Afghanistan. The sections will attempt to answer the question if a template style of post-conflict intervention be responsive or irresponsible to the variations demanded by local circumstances.

Case studies for Sri Lanka and Afghanistan

Firstly, two completely different approaches to development were essential as the policies necessary to carry out reshaping programmes in Afghanistan specifically targeting reconstruction aid development for entrepreneurial skills and macroeconomic stability were non-existent whereas imposing aid programmes were (Castillo, 2008, p. 186). The state mechanism was weak in the case of Afghanistan. The Sri Lankan conflict made apparent that where there is a functioning state with two clearly defined political parties with a strong military command, a light footprint approach is appropriate (Goodhand, 2006, p. 127).

Secondly, in the case of Sri Lanka factors the roots of hostility were pretty shallow which led to war weariness. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was classed as a civil war and not a Global War On Terror (GWOT). Thus did not get the International focus as it was a political strategy by the newly-elected Sri Lankan government to direct negotiations to themselves rather than outside negotiations from the US. In Afghanistan, however, it was exactly the opposite scenario in which internal factors played a minor role and international policies toward the country played a major role (Goodhand, 2006, pp. 17-24).

Thirdly, Jonathan Goodhand's (2006) case study on NGOs in respect of indirect and direct approaches to peace-building in Afghanistan were of various types and mixes, such as the conflict-sensitive approach, governance, socio-economic development, conflict prevention, mediation, reconciliation, security sector, and advocacy (Goodhand, 2006, p. 151). The hybridisation processes to attain peace were, as previously mentioned, a mismatch of policies and aid practices. In the case of Afghanistan, international NGOs were considerably weaker in the areas of local capacity building and advocacy, as that was what was required. The significant difference on a project-based approach exposed the limitations of both humanitarian actions in general terms and peace-building in particular terms..

Fourthly, in Afghanistan there were multiple hostilities, state collapse, ethicised social relations, politicisation of aid, and arm's length engagement (Goodhand, 2006, p. 175). A hybrid system in Afghanistan and fragmented modes of policy-making created winners and losers, which is covered in the next section (Goodhand, 2006, p. 174). NGOs are seen as agents of Northern Security policy (Goodhand, 2006, p. 176). Afghanistan is a rural agricultural economy with high levels of illiteracy, a weak central government, terrorism,

warlords, and a military presence which makes it a volatile country (Brynen , 2005, pp. 223-224). Afghan policies are discussed from headquarters outside the country, for example the aid coordination committee led by 16 donor countries called the Afghanistan Support Group (ASG). The Afghan state government is ill-equipped and the border areas are under the jurisdiction of warlords and the Taliban, even today (Brynen , 2005, p. 236). The violence here is not only political, but also the resurgent drug trade in the hinterlands, where weak enforcement is fuelled by criminality and a vicious circle for economically needy people and as such beyond NGOs domain (Brynen , 2005, p. 236).

Finally, the difference between the two countries was the participation of the World Bank in the Sri Lankan case and a strategic framework of a good policy governance in the Afghanistan case, which produced different results to aid policies. Development aid is political and requires a legitimised government whereas humanitarian aid is ethical and targeted towards the individual. The response to peace-building in Sri Lanka was to a greater degree due to bilateral agencies refocusing aid policies, whereas the impact in Afghanistan was limited because the links between outside influences and internal compliances were surrounded by weak structures (Goodhand, 2006, pp. 142-143). Peace-building policies can be manoeuvred with the optimal conditionality of structures, but aid markets differ for each country and the overarching frameworks conceal NGO activities (Goodhand, 2006, p. 176). The failure of the top-down elite-led peace process on one hand and deep politics of some societies on the other suggest that NGOs can have a comparable advantage to peace-building with a state, as was the Sri Lankan case (Goodhand, 2006, p. 2006). For example, NGOs working in Sri Lanka could withstand the pressures because the environment was counterbalanced by a stronger network. Contrastingly, NGOs are becoming marginalised actors in Afghanistan because of limited manoeuvrability in challenging the rigid donor policies (Goodhand, 2006, pp. 168-169).

To conclude, no theory can work without institutional structures; even economic theory works under the assumption of an autonomous agency which includes behaviours of individuals and interaction between market variables (Sumner & Tribe, 2008, p. 90). The problem with Jonathan Goodhand's case study on types of conflict gives only the broader dimension in order to match responses to contexts, but his study omits cultural dimensions (Goodhand, 2006, pp. 17-25). This argument was supplemented by Sumner and Tribe (2008) who argue that social anthropology theorists cannot assume that individual behaviours can be moulded by the framework of the embedded agency, but a case study should include a holistic approach to the culture of the individual and not be based on autonomy of free trade alone (Sumner & Tribe, 2008, p. 90). For the purpose of this paper it should be emphasised that the essay does not answer the question about how peace

interventionists, organisations, and NGOs are shaping development world societies through cultural and social relationships in post-conflict societies: this, remains a contentious issue in the Afghanistan case study. Security discussions include military and non-military intervention and humanitarian aid, which are integrated into global discussions as part of a move towards economic globalisation (Bell, 2016). However, the basic assumption that the theory of liberal peace was to be achieved through economic reform and good governance through bureaucratic reform has produced a culture clash of traditionalism and modernism theories (Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009, p. 51). While it is not imperative to bring up this argument, it is necessary to highlight the relativist approach of western theorists' case studies that liberal states using free trade as an instrument for policies to promote political ends by altering preferences and features of other states was not the answer, as the Afghanistan case will show (Deudney & Ikenberry, 1999).

My own argument is that any policy-related quests cannot ostracise cultures and any development agenda must have a more inclusive approach by taking the specific needs of the population into considering during project design and policy. The problem with the post-war conflict society case studies in this essay is that the research approach, even though analytical, was not only Eurocentric, but also generalises about Afghanistan from a subjective perspective. Afghanistan is a diverse country and, for example, the liberal peace theory approach on the clash of cultures shows the superiority of the western political order and relationships (Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009, p. 52). Even so, Castillo blames the UN and the World Bank for the untimely and inaccurate stakeholder analysis because the social needs and economic needs were left out, and there was no inclusive approach of the marginalised population during project design and policy-making process, and more particularly the dynamics around ownership and operational logistics (Castillo, 2008, pp. 228-229).

Regarding the topic of the two states, the case studies draw a distinction between internal conflict and international conflict, peace-building, and peace-keeping. The following part of this paper describes in greater detail a brief Oxfam case study and DFID policies which were introduced and new techniques which were result-oriented in Afghanistan. Both approaches create winners and losers, which is explained in the next section. However, the bigger implications are that DFID policies around development were aimed at offsetting criticisms domestically of Blair's whole-hearted support to the USA's invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq and expanded arms sales. This essay puts forward an ethical argument of untying aid as neo-liberal policies seem to hijack the original agenda, which is to protect the interests of those who are the policy recipients (Mawdsley, 2015, p. 346).

In the next section, I will demonstrate how carelessly humanitarian aid development policies were deployed by hasty and untimely assessments that were suited to pursue neo-liberal western agendas to such a degree that it has reinforced the importance of state policies in Afghanistan (Castillo, 2008, pp. 229-2230). The remaining part of the essay questions the very asymmetrical power relations and decision-making processes that were monopolised by non-state actors and informal institutions. Just as Goodhand points out “domestic accountability” (Goodhand & Sedra, 2010, p. s97), Brahmini also hotly contests the ownership issues at the Bonn conference as a neo-colonial drive by the bilateral actors and NGOs who had a “heavy footprint” in that region (Castillo, 2008, p. 185). Ownership was linked as an external form of accountability, and international actors were blamed for illegal practises as the polices were beneficial to some and neglectful of other groups.

Winners

The UN's aid missions are integrated across territorial borders of Afghanistan, Kosovo, and from the Caribbean regions, through Africa, the Balkans and Middle East (Duffield, 2010, p. 4). “For example, ‘reconstruction’ of Afghanistan was seen as a global project and it connected the Afghan towns with the homes of South Korean aid workers and conference rooms in Washington DC and London where policies were hashed out and the hometowns of serving soldiers” (Kirsch & Flint, 2011, p. 15). The Trade in Global Value Chain Initiative (TGVCI) is an example of how DFID is working with the private sector, and the new strategic framework, which is politically motivated in the UK and US, has come under scrutiny (Mawdsley, 2015, p. 352). The relationship between foreign aid and international development and the dynamics of Smart Aid to provide value to aid is to leverage political party interests in host countries as the economic gap is widening between rich and poor countries (Mawdsley, 2015, p. 354). Donini (2009) questions the cursory review of the aid architecture as humanitarianism worldwide is at stake. In Afghanistan for example, externally directed state projects, conditions of structural underdevelopment, manipulation, and foreign occupation have dampened the spirits of the civilians after 30 years of war. Furthermore, failures of aid communities to assist in times of drought and poverty disasters pose a huge challenge to international communities. This provides a critical lens on policy-making from the humanitarian approach, showing it as risky, and the legitimacy of operating in a post-conflict region which is still at war and has no peace (Donini, 2009, pp. 1-2). The asymmetrical nature of power relations in the context of post-conflict societies requires a deeper understanding and a specific analysis of policy-making processes which are distorted. On the one hand is the theory of realism, which is associated with “International State System characterised by national identities competing for prestige, power and wealth

(Davis, 2013, p. 7).” On the other hand, in a reconstruction good governance model the government in Kabul endeavoured to create a political framework which was suitable to the needs of the World Bank (Davis, 2013, p. 33). Sceptics argue that US and allies ration their moral services to a few strategic areas where the defence of principle is of vital interest (Davis, 2013, p. 22). In line with this, Donini (2010) explains that the misconception of the humanitarian approach to development in the Afghanistan case study was based on an erroneous assumption that Afghanistan is still a post-conflict society. In reality, south, south-east and western parts of Afghanistan are highly volatile regions because of Taliban threats and certain parts are classed as no-go areas even for aid workers (Donini, 2009, pp. 4-5). Humanitarian aid, for example, is through cash-based interventions and DFID monitors the Afghan government to implement policy, as the MPesa mobile network transfer and Vodaphone are the most suitable way to send funds (Samuel Hall, 2014). This is an example of a global partnership and *effective* cooperation through privatisation which serves donor interest needs, particularly in Afghanistan where the state is weak and domestic aid policies are dictated by politicians of donor countries and NGO pressures (Mawdsley, 2015, p. 348).

Castillo (2008) argues that the aid policies are in disarray and donors need to reorient themselves to avoid failing projects (Castillo, 2008, p. 296) (Goodhand & Sedra, 2010). Pressures are exerted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and donor agencies to privatise the banks partially or completely and decentralise economic structures favouring private capital from domestic and foreign markets (Addison, et al., 2005, p. 220). Moreover, the good governance policy is embedded in the IMF and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan report. The IMF report legitimises the fact that policy-makers and development actors mutually cooperate to pursue their neo-liberal agendas, design policies on price, stability, and adjustment of exchange rates, and provide technical assistance to outside experts and staff (International Monetary Fund, 2011, pp. 1-9). The paradoxical situation in the case of Afghanistan rests on the fact that the state is weakened and the same report demands domestic bold policy reforms. Furthermore, the collapse of the Kabul Bank suggests that policies favoured the western neoclassical economies and the free market. The prevalence of corruption and the Hawala system has left Kabul with an informal financial mechanism. International sanctions on the Central Bank and looting of banks by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda leadership have weakened the institutional capacity of the system (Addison, et al., 2005, p. 216). As already mentioned, aid policies and politics become intertwined with UN’s interventionist programmes such as DDR, and efforts have also failed in Afghanistan apart from defeating the Taliban forces (Addison, et al., 2005, p. 239). Policy-makers are perplexed about how to *win* the war on terror as a new approach of *winning hearts and minds*, but the bigger picture is that any militarised development agenda leads to a

contentious debate as *neutrality and impartiality* motives become questionable (Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009, p. 19).

Losers

Good policy stems from the American concept of a liberal state ideology which is based on good governance and competitive markets (Cramer, 2006, p. 255). There are losers in the process, as Castillo highlights the donor-driven dimension of international organisations and donor agencies imposing their ideologies through military efforts on Afghan people (Castillo, 2008, pp. 230-231).

Moreover, Duffield (2010) argues that non-state actors fair badly in securing favourable peace agreements as they were seen as political moves (Duffield, 2010, pp. 4-5). Policy-making is problematic in itself as the US military allies with regional warlords and in the meantime periodic attacks on UN and NGOs workers hamper humanitarian aid assistance (Addison, et al., 2005, p. 239). Most research suggests that state transformation needs to occur both at an institutional and day-to-day level in Afghanistan. As Castillo suggests, the ideological differences in the role of states and linking sanctions to donor participation requires aid actors to collaborate with national authorities closely and evades ownership issues (Castillo, 2008, p. 228). Moreover, it legitimises the fact that military intervention and development are used as tools for industrialising poor countries and spreading capitalism (Cramer, 2006, pp. 253-254). Castillo and Cramer, for instance, cite the Bonn Conference where Brahmini hotly contested ownership issues and blamed the West for the neo-colonial drive by the bilateral actors and NGOs as a “heavy footprint” and highly illiberal practises (Castillo, 2008, p. 185). The failures of the UN and the donors to finance security-related expenditures and donors who bypass government agencies and involve their own experts and firms cause more damage, which was more apparent in Afghanistan as the population rejected it (Castillo, 2008, p. 296). For example, a British Christian Organisation aid worker was killed by the Taliban because her organisation was proselytising (Gall, 2008). Single issue and faith-based NGOs are excluded from protection, putting aid workers lives at risk. “The training and physical protection appears directly related to the size and resources the organisation has to address issues with and it remains an under-researched area” (Duffield, 2010, p. 15). There are hardly any debates around policy in Afghanistan. For example, a survey by the Feinstein International Centre shows that a simplistic and homogenous approach does not allow for an accurate perception of what Antonio Donini (2010) calls the “*Dunantist*” approach. According to Donini (2010), humanitarianism is under deep threat in Afghanistan. The UN is aligned to US-led coalitions in intervention policies. The multi-

mandate organisations and NGOs focus primarily on reconstruction, development aid, advocacy, or single issues. For example, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRS) is the only single organisation that works neutrally, independently, and impartially in Afghanistan. ICRS acts on humanitarian principles and defends both sides in a conflict. However, even that is impaired as access and negotiations with the Taliban or insurgent groups can be highly volatile. The absence of critical analysis principled on the *Dunantist* approach, such as lack of humanitarian workers on the ground, is a case in point to the limited quality of debates around policy (Donini, 2009, p. 2). According to Donini (2010), the principled humanitarian approaches to combat the universal comprehensive approaches and response come from the erroneous assumption that Afghanistan still remains a country at war. The reality is that humanitarian aid workers are cut off from south, south-east and western parts of Afghanistan due to Taliban threats. It is difficult to ascertain the actual depth and breadth of the crisis as there are no-go areas. For example, aid strategies in Afghanistan are fragmented, because the illicit economy supports drug-trafficking in the peripheral regions. Aid-dependent and a chronically poor population in regional centres around Kabul became integrated with neighbouring countries (Goodhand & Sedra, 2010, p. 845). In other words, when one talks about conflict in Afghanistan, its territorial reach over its narcotics economy spreads over Central Asia and Middle East. The geo-political importance of Afghanistan's Kashmir, Tajikstan, and Ferghana valley and neighbouring countries such as Russia, Pakistan, and Iraq are parallel economies and act as conduits to massive arms dealings whose pipelines run from the US to Pakistan Mujahideens and military dealings of Osama Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and the Taliban (Cramer, 2006, pp. 192-193). Such activities require a state apparatus and the will of the Afghani people which is lacking at a societal level to accept changes to the society (Goodhand & Sedra, 2010).

Geopolitics of Aid and Media

The geopolitics of foreign aid is largely political and it is the very political nature of aid which is the driving force behind it being a foreign policy tool. Media can be instrumental to resolve conflicts, but the focus on peace-building is minimal and Afghanistan's strategic importance and links to Russia. For example, Obama supported the war in Afghanistan because of the adversary nature, and although he was "not culpable" for the war, he was made a culpable target by the Republican Party in 2008. Obama won the re-election in 2012 because the

public approved the Democrats handling the Afghanistan war, and Osama bin Laden's death in May 2011 gave popularity to Obama's winning election campaign (Croco, 2015, pp. 174-178). Such an example of how aid policies were used to manoeuvre elections in host countries. Researchers are critical of the Afghan government's failures since 2002 to stabilise its economy and free it from drug abuse, which has led to donor fatigue and apathy in that region (Castillo, 2008, p. 186). This is an example of the template style of post-conflict intervention being unresponsive to the variations demanded by local circumstances, such as a stronger state. The host countries benefited from aid policies at the expense of the beneficiaries. The problem was that the implementation of policies was consistent with the development actors and politicians who were involved so long as it was creditable for them and their image.

On the other hand, media focus on the Taliban has diminished fund-raising opportunities because of security conditions, and discouraged donors in providing aid or fund wastage (Castillo, 2008, p. 185). A top-to-bottom approach option of aid is preferable (Castillo, 2008, p. 187). Obama's foreign policy success was considered the strongest area even though the unpopular war carried on for four years and kept him in power (Croco, 2015, p. 178). Dahlman (2014) research admits that the politicisation of the Afghanistan war was to benefit the US, and neo-conservative propaganda campaigns by journalists sway the public opinion on the war on terror, gulf war, cold war, Al Qaeda war, and Taliban war by side-lining the issues into a religious war and changing policies in the favour of the west (Dahlman, 2011, p. 187). The bigger picture is that the media can have a detrimental effect on policies and programs in war torn states, changing the aid response (Dahlman, 2011, p. 187). It can also affect the UN Security council decision-making process, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian affairs (ORHA), and the peace and negotiation process, and counterinsurgency tactics may be seen as negative peace (Dahlman, 2011, pp. 189-195).

The previous section has shown that a prescriptive model of policies would not work in Afghanistan where the threat of the Taliban still persists. It seems that infrastructural and institutional design is better if it comes from within, that is to say a stronger state is a prerequisite for long-term policy objectives. Reconstruction programs as constituted by the US have led to political dysfunction, deaths of civilians, and civil disorder. The Afghanistan case study highlights that war and reconstruction, simultaneously with breaking and remaking a state through foreign intervention, was not the solution for peace (Dahlman, 2011, p. 179). This case study is a significant departure from previous studies where the Marshal plan was used after WW2 to rebuild Germany, and yet failed to do the same in Afghanistan and Iraq (Dahlman, 2011, p. 179). There was peace in Germany when the Marshal Plan was initiated, but Afghanistan has never had peace. In retrospect, the biggest

drawback for these international agencies was the failure for drug substitution programmes, and intervention failed to tackle poppy cultivation. The Afghanistan case exposed the limitations of the project-based development approach in a region where there is a weak state (Goodhand & Sedra, 2010, p. 844). Food security, health, and education institutional structures were ill-defined and arbitrary quota systems meant that aid was not forthcoming and not beneficial to the level envisaged (Goodhand & Sedra, 2010, p. 847).

Pure Political Economy Approach versus Context-Specific Theory

A critical point of consideration is that donor agencies bypass the Afghan government and disburse monies themselves rather than through host government agencies (Davis, 2013, p. 33). Hence, in order to understand the analysis from a pure political economy approach, power issues and relationships in humanitarian crises are examined, and how actors are defining or interpreting their interest goals and resources is considered (Heyse, 2015, p. 18).

However, the Marsden's analysis on the reconstruction of Afghanistan show that the Afghan government has been responding excessively to the demands of international rather than internal agencies. One of the most conclusive observations is Chandler's criticism on the perception of a weak and ineffective Afghan government, which stems from the failure to link power to accountability. The renewing of concerns based on the notion that local power holders continue to be independent by resorting to conflict to assert their dominance explains how deplorable the situation is (Davis, 2013, p. 33). Posner argues the role of civil society organisations to support stable development, but even a thriving state society finds it difficult to create social welfare and so post-conflict societies have very little hope (Davis, 2013, p. 33). For example, that the Mine Action programme in Afghanistan's livestock, farming, and community forestry did not bring peace but provided an alternative to the war economy is an example of a coping strategy (Goodhand & Sedra, 2010, p. 844).

My argument on aid policies in Afghanistan, for example, is based on the lines of reasoning suggested by David Chandler's criticisms of the international community's attitudes and methodologies that disregard the local sensitivities in favour of the World Bank (Davis, 2013, p. 32). In this regard, he suggests a rational approach whereby the local actors are better placed to take their own country forward. In my opinion, the context-specific theories or micro-picture theories can help implement or design policies for host countries as these theories do not include the neo-liberal strategy, but may still focus on the deeper understanding of post-conflict societies (Sumner & Tribe, 2008, pp. 85-86). For example, the

Copenhagen School of Security Studies' analysis of threat perception and decision-making heuristics relies upon a context analysis tool (Zwitter & Joost, 2015, pp. 29-42). An example of a context-specific theory would be OXFAM's policy *Within and Without the State: Afghanistan (WWS Afghanistan)* (OXFAM GB, 2017), and a DFID funded project designed to combat other conflict situations is also available to explain the idea (OXFAM GB, 2017).

There is a very cursory consideration that the decision-making on a contextual analysis basis is assumed for all countries where volatile humanitarian crises exist and that rely on empirically and theoretically sound data (Zwitter & Joost, 2015, p. 29). The UN focuses on a human-centred approach and legitimises interference in the internal affairs. That quality of human life is threatened through human rights violations is a case in point. It is all the more paradoxical that the UN claims the *global security debate* as the main universal focus and shows the diminishing value of the state role in post-conflict areas (Zwitter & Joost, 2015, pp. 30-32). As far as the human component of security is concerned the UN needs to change the *modus operandi* of the universal acceptability concept and good governance theory, to include the physical and mental wellbeing of the population (Zwitter & Joost, 2015, p. 32). As Pierre Krahenbuhl, director of operations for the Red Cross in Afghanistan, denotes "the incorporation of humanitarian action into governmental counterinsurgency strategies have a devastating effect upon aid workers in the field (Lamont, 2015, p. 63)."

Conclusion

As a conclusion, policies were inclined towards using public money for domestic corporate expansions, whereas what was required in Afghanistan was a capital investment to build services and infrastructure. A deeper understanding of the asymmetrical thought processes of joblessness, socially marginalised, low waged groups in the west, and morality when it comes to developing countries are rarely mentioned in research (Mawdsley, 2015, p. 345). The discourse on post conflict aid and the Neo Liberal model in Developing countries are used as experimentation grounds to test western policies, and the Afghanistan case is more of a political argument than an ethical or holistic, approach. The essay has attempted to deconstruct the political economy of aid and the unequal power dynamics where the state is weak. Western governments need to be held accountable and this is only possible if the people of Afghanistan had strong foreign aid policies which could question western motives. Hence, when considering policy-making through intervention, the notion of reconstruction should be on individual cases based on moral intervention and not on the globalization argument as it may have disempowered the Afghan people who became recipient of west policies which did not work theoretically. Through my research I reflected on Kimberley Zisk Marten's critical comparative analysis notes the neo-imperialistic western agenda in the context of reconstruction of post-conflict societies to colonial empires. Marten's insightful explanation of both phenomena of colonial and post-conflict imperialism are similar: "where a desire of outsiders is to control political events happening on the ground abroad" (Davis, 2013, p. 22). The research enabled me to understand the false dichotomy in post conflict regions about peace and war. I questioned the possibility of reconstruction during war periods in a geographical sense, is fixed, but the other variable factors such as backlash of time and space, cultures, and behaviours in post war periods differ in regions. I came to the conclusion that reconstruction in Afghanistan is a long-term process, and institutionalising and standardising templates are failures as conflicts evolve in post-conflict spaces and the long-term prospects of negative peace are challenging (Kirsch & Flint, 2011, pp. 12-13).

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